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CHAPTER 4: THE EU CONTEXT 
Chad Damro and Donald MacKenzie 
INTRODUCTION 
While the European Union (EU) is a prominent player in the politics of climate change, 
it is neither a state nor an international organization in the traditional sense. Rather, it 
operates as a proactive and authoritative regional collective of affluent democracies that 
can influence policy-making in significant ways at the regional and international levels. 
This unique position also means that EU policy-making is subject to multiple pressures 
from both these levels. Despite – and possibly because of – this, the EU proudly 
promotes its collective efforts as an exemplar of how to tackle climate change through a 
combination of international and regional commitments. 
This chapter begins by discussing the domestic and international foundations of 
EU climate policy. It then explores political analysis conducted in this area, including 
explanations for developments in climate policy at the EU level. Next, it identifies a 
number of international obstacles to EU climate policy and domestic and regional 
obstacles to its Emissions Trading Scheme. Particular focus is given to emissions 
trading, rather than the EU’s initiatives on renewable energies, biofuels, and vehicle 
emissions, because emissions trading is widely regarded as the mainstay of the EU’s 
climate strategy, now and into the future. It also exemplifies many generic political 
tensions that exist within EU climate policy. The chapter concludes by identifying 
political strategies available to the EU for overcoming these obstacles and by arguing 
that, despite the multiple domestic and international pressures facing the EU, it seems 
certain to play a sustained and active role in this policy area. 
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EU CLIMATE POLICY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
The EU’s extensive authority in environmental policy is especially noteworthy given 
that environmental policy was not included in the primary legislation (treaties) of the EU 
until the 1986 Single European Act. As the twenty-seven member states have pooled 
sovereignty in environmental policy, the Union has developed the legal and political 
capacity to play a significant role in international environmental policy-making and to 
promulgate domestic climate change legislation. For simplicity, this study refers to the 
‘EU’ throughout, despite legal distinctions that exist between the EU and European 
Community (EC) in this policy area. The term ‘EC’ will be used only when necessary 
for legal clarity and when cited in secondary sources. 
At the international level, the EU has been an active participant in United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations since their 
beginning. The EU and its member states actively promoted the Kyoto Protocol and 
2002 Marrakech Agreement and were rewarded for their efforts in 2005 when enough 
countries ratified the Protocol for it to enter into force. A contentious international 
priority for the EU during these negotiations has been the establishment of binding 
emissions reduction targets within set timeframes for Annex I countries. Despite shifting 
positions and fluctuating impact during the nearly decade-long UNFCCC negotiations – 
notably at the Sixth Conference of Parties in Den Hague (Grubb and Yamin 2001) – the 
Union is now often described as a ‘leader’ or ‘frontrunner’ in international climate 
policy-making (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Christiansen and Wettestad 2003; Gupta 
and Grubb 2000; Gupta and Ringius 2001; Zito 2005; Skodvin and Andresen 2006).  
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As the EU has established itself in this area, its internal policy actors have had to 
navigate a unique landscape of regional institutions. Space constraints prevent a detailed 
review of the EU’s various internal decision-making bodies – including the European 
Commission, European Council, Council of Ministers, European Parliament, European 
Court of Justice (Jordan 2005; Jordan and Schout  2006; Lenschow 2005; McCormick 
2001) – or procedures. However, it is worth noting that the Commission holds primary 
responsibility for proposing new policies (under broad strategic guidance given by the 
European Council of Heads of State and more specific requests from relevant Councils 
of Ministers) and for ensuring the member states implement EU laws properly. 
Decisions on whether to accept or veto Commission proposals are made by the Council 
of Ministers in co-decision with the European Parliament for most areas of 
environmental policy. Measures affecting taxation powers, choices on the structure of 
energy supply, and most areas of land-use planning all require unanimous Council 
approval, whereas qualified majority voting is generally applied to other policy areas. 
The Commission has undertaken a number of EU climate-related initiatives since 
1991, when it issued the EU’s first strategy to limit CO2 emissions and improve energy 
efficiency. This strategy included measures to promote renewable energy, voluntary 
commitments by automobile manufacturers to reduce CO2 emissions (upgraded to 
mandatory targets in 2008) and proposals for common taxes on energy products. The 
Council of Environment Ministers then asked the Commission to develop priority 
actions and policy measures, which resulted in the launch of the European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP) in June 2000.The ECCP has acted as the Commission’s 
main instrument to identify and develop an EU strategy to implement the Kyoto 
Protocol. The negotiations over the first ECCP involved various stakeholder groups, 
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including representatives from the Commission’s Directorates-General, member states, 
and industry and environmental groups. The political influence exercised by these 
different actors often varies across the different issues and instruments under discussion. 
Likewise, political influence and the likelihood of policy change often varies with the 
specific constellation of member states actively involved, in particular the positions 
taken by environmental leaders and laggards within the Union (Lenschow 2005; Börzel 
2000). A case in point is the failed proposal for a common EU carbon/energy tax, which 
was opposed by various member states on economic or national sovereignty grounds 
but, as a measure that conferred taxation powers on the EU, required unanimous Council 
support to come into force. The compromise solution was relatively lax common 
minimum duties on a range of energy products. 
As is shown in Table 4.1, the ECCP has generated a considerable volume of EU-
level legislation, primarily directives that the member states are legally bound to 
transpose into national laws. According to the Commission’s accounting, the EU has 
introduced over 30 climate change initiatives since 2000. 
 
Table 4.1 near HERE 
 
The EU launched its second ECCP in October 2005. This is designed to run in 
close cooperation with a wide range of stakeholders and is organized around several 
working groups tasked with reviewing ECCP I (with five subgroups: transport, energy 
supply, energy demand, non-CO2 gases, agriculture) and the EU’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme as well as exploring climate measures in aviation, automobiles, carbon capture 
and storage, and adaptation to climate change. 
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The Commission also organizes its work around the EU Environmental Action 
Programmes (EAP), which set out the framework and strategic priorities for EU 
environmental policy. These are non-binding frameworks that establish agendas, but the 
individual regulatory interventions that follow are still subject to political negotiations 
on a case-by-case basis. The most recent Sixth EAP runs from 2002-2012, and includes 
four priority areas: climate change; nature and biodiversity; environment and health; and 
natural resources and waste. The earlier Fifth EAP (1993) also included climate change 
among its themes. 
The EU’s ambitious position on greenhouse-gas emissions reductions was clearly 
elaborated by the European Council meeting of Heads of State and Government held in 
March 2007, where it was agreed that the EU would cut its emissions to at least 20 per 
cent below 1990 levels by 2020. In addition, the EU committed to cutting ‘its emissions 
to 30% below 1990 levels by 2020 provided that, as part of a global and comprehensive 
post-2012 agreement, other developed countries commit to comparable reductions and 
advanced developing countries also contribute adequately to the global effort according 
to their respective capabilities’ (European Commission 2007: 9). The EU intends to 
achieve these reductions through the measures agreed in the ECCPs and ‘new measures 
included in an integrated climate and energy strategy’ (European Commission 2007: 9). 
The Commission released the first wave of proposals in January 2008, which included a 
major expansion in the stringency and scope of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). 
Additional climate change measures include increasing research and technological 
development. The EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development 
(2007-13) has an increased budget of 8.4 billion Euro allocated for environment, energy 
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and transport. This programme is designed to assist the ‘soonest possible deployment of 
clean technologies as well as further strengthening knowledge of climate change and its 
impacts’ (European Commission 2007: 12). The EU is committed to increasing this 
research budget further after 2013. 
The EU’s flagship policy to combat climate change is undoubtedly the EU ETS 
(Watanabe and Robinson 2005). The establishment of the internal EU ETS demonstrates 
how the Union can operate as an authoritative regional point of interaction between the 
national and international levels. At the national level, the EU ETS now covers roughly 
half of the EU’s CO2 emissions. At the international level, it represents a case where the 
EU changed its position and now seems to be demonstrating international leadership by 
example. In operational terms, the promise of the EU ETS seems positive, but questions 
remain about the modalities of emissions trading, the competing interests engaged in 
emissions trading and the actual abatement that will result from emissions trading 
processes. The EU ETS is also likely to serve as a future linking system to other 
national, regional and international emissions trading schemes (Oberthür 2006; Legge 
2007). For example, the EU ETS recognizes Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation credits, up to certain agreed limits set at national level, as equivalent 
emissions allowances that can be used within the scheme. 
Despite its unique and complex political arrangements, the EU has engaged 
actively in the initiation, institutionalization and implementation of a variety of climate-
related policies. Because of its unique nature, the EU has had to develop a system of 
governance capable of channelling various domestic and international pressures to its 
advantage. The result has been a comprehensive ECCP, which includes emissions 
trading, and international recognition as an environmental leader. The next section 
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explores how this high state of activity and influence has been evaluated and explained 
by relevant observers. 
 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF EU CLIMATE POLICY 
EU climate policy has generated a vast amount of practical and academic debate and 
research in recent years. The practical debate and analysis has engaged many civil 
society interest groups (citizens, media, public authorities, the private sector and non-
governmental organizations) (Mazey and Richardson 1992; Michaelowa 1998) and 
policy institutions such as the Institute for European Environmental Policy, Ecologic, 
Centre for European Policy Studies and European Environmental Bureau. Actively 
interacting with civil society, the EU holds a variety of stakeholder consultation 
workshops on issues such as the Green Paper on Adapting to Climate Change in Europe. 
Its ECCPs have also benefited from the input of such stakeholder groups. In 1990, the 
EU made an internal institutional stride into this pubic debate when the Council 
approved the creation of the European Environment Agency (EEA). The key role of the 
EEA is information provider and analyst. While it is not directly involved in policy-
making, it boasts a membership of over thirty countries, including non-EU states like 
Turkey and Switzerland. 
In addition to civil society actors and the EEA, numerous academics have weighed 
in with analyses of competing policy options as well as the technical and economic 
implications of EU climate policy. For example, scholars have analyzed the modalities 
and politics of burden-sharing (Oberthür 2006), national allocation plans (Betz et al., 
2006), issues surrounding the auctioning of emissions permits (Mandell 2005; Hepburn 
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et al. 2006), challenges to the EU ETS (Grubb and Neuhoff 2006) and various options 
for the EU’s long term strategies and goals in climate policy (Winne et al. 2005). 
The academic literature on the politics of climate change also covers a number of 
international and regional issues related to EU climate policy and the linkages across 
different levels of analysis. The decision to establish the EU ETS provides a useful 
example of such cross-level linkages. The creation of the world’s largest and most 
comprehensive emissions trading scheme in 2003 was a major innovation, with 
significant costs in terms of time and other resources. Add to this the international 
uncertainty surrounding the Kyoto Protocol when the EU began formulating the EU 
ETS, and the Union’s decision to move forward with the initiative seems to have been 
particularly puzzling and risky. Many factors from the national, EU and international 
levels have had an impact on this decision, which several studies have tried to 
disentangle. 
First, studies have explored the EU’s motivations for adopting the idea of 
emissions trading after initially resisting it in international negotiations. Damro and 
Luaces-Mendéz (2003) argue that the EU did so as part of a process of policy learning 
from US experiences with similar domestic schemes. Woerdman (2004) moves beyond 
policy learning to argue from a path-dependence approach that the shift occurred as the 
result of internal and external pressures to maintain climate leadership. Cass (2005) 
argues that the EU’s advocacy of emissions trading is best understood as the result of 
shifting ‘frames’ of debate that allowed the Union to overcome domestic obstacles that 
had previously prevented support for other market-based mechanisms. 
Other studies have focused on the specific reasons why the EU issued its 2003 
directive establishing the EU ETS. Wettestad (2005) tends to emphasize the central role 
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played by the Commission in utilizing climate science and emissions trends to overcome 
veto points, while Oberthür (2006) and Oberthür and Tänzler (2007) emphasize the 
causal role of international regimes. The sum total of these scholarly efforts suggests 
that explanations of the EU ETS need to consider a significant causal role for domestic 
and international factors. 
It is worth identifying briefly some important institutional and other pressures 
from different levels that help to explain the EU ETS. At its most basic level, the EU 
ETS arose from the UNFCCC and the resulting Kyoto commitments. Early in the 
negotiations, the EU resisted emissions trading in favour of more command-and-control 
regulatory and taxation schemes. By contrast, the US was the primary driver of this 
instrument based on its experience with domestic sulphur dioxide trading (Christiansen 
and Wettestad 2003; Damro and Luaces-Mendéz 2003). As the EU gradually changed its 
position, the US reduced its commitment to the Kyoto Process as President Clinton 
decided not to send the Protocol to a Senate that publicly opposed ratification and 
President Bush repudiated the protocol in March 2001 (Lisowski 2002; Steurer 2003). 
The differing EU and US positions were a point of contention from the outset of 
the negotiations. As Sbragia (1998: 299) points out, as early as ‘1992 EU Finance 
Ministers insisted that any EU carbon tax be implemented only on condition that the 
USA and Japan acted in kind. Japan agreed on condition that the USA enact some kind 
of carbon tax. The Clinton administration refused’. The EU’s gradual acceptance of 
emissions trading allowed for compromise and created an opportunity for progress in the 
negotiations. Some of the change in the EU position can certainly be attributed to an 
international process of policy learning. For example, Commission officials observed 
US trading schemes in action and stated publicly that ‘The ETS’s “cap and trade” 
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system was inspired by a United States model introduced in the 1990s to curb acid rain’ 
(European Commission 2006: 2). Domestic politics and institutional obstacles also 
played a role. In the early 1990s, the Commission realized that it would face a difficult, 
if not impossible, battle with the member states over a carbon/energy tax because fiscal 
instruments require unanimous support in the Council of Ministers. Since the 
Commission was unlikely to convince all member states to agree to the tax, it began 
promoting carbon trading. The combination, therefore, of international policy learning 
and domestic political-institutional constraints highlight the pressures coming from 
different levels. This change of policy approach has placed the EU in an international 
‘leadership’ role by becoming the most important advocate of emissions trading within 
the Kyoto framework (Wettestad 2005). 
As its international role and commitment evolved, the EU began to push for a 
domestic Europe-wide ETS – an initiative that, crucially, was supported by important 
economic actors as a new market to complement any future international emissions 
trading schemes. Despite the costs, the EU moved forward very rapidly in establishing 
the new instrument (Oberthür and Tänzler 2007). The speed with which this happened is 
striking for two reasons: (i) the EU lacked previous experience with this market-based 
mechanism; and (ii) its advocates had to, and did, overcome obstacles within the EU’s 
complex policy-making process quickly and skilfully. 
 
OBSTACLES TO EU CLIMATE POLICY 
Despite the EU’s apparent success in its multi-level engagements with climate policy, it 
faces a number of international and domestic political obstacles to more vigorous action 
on climate policy. Given the multitude of significant veto points during international 
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negotiations and the development of internal policies, this section focuses on key 
selected international and regional obstacles facing the EU and its flagship ETS, many 
of which are shared with other aspects of EU climate policy. 
 
International Obstacles to EU Climate Policy 
While climate change mitigation is clearly in the interest of all states, the means through 
which responsive polices will be negotiated and promulgated internationally remain 
subject to the specific domestic politics in individual states and the variety of public- and 
private-sector actors involved in these politics. At the international level, obstacles 
include the need to overcome the conflicting interests of the negotiating parties in the 
UNFCCC and obstacles to initiatives promoting global environmental governance 
(Vogler 2005). 
First and foremost, the EU must consider the role played by the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP was launched in 
January 2006 as a non-treaty agreement and currently includes Australia, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, Republic of Korea and USA (see Chapter 12). APP members account for 
about half of the world’s population, economic output, greenhouse gas emissions and 
energy consumption. They also produce about 65 per cent of the world’s coal, 48 per 
cent of the world’s steel, 37 per cent of the world’s aluminum, and 61 per cent of the 
world’s cement (APP 2008). The APP’s priorities focus on technology-based solutions 
and a determination that members should be allowed to set their own goals for reducing 
emissions individually, with no mandatory enforcement mechanisms. The EU accepts 
technological solutions as additional measures to combat climate change; however, the 
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EU’s firm advocacy of binding enforcement mechanisms makes it uncertain how far it 
will be able to pursue compromise with the APP. 
Second, a fully and consistently operable EU ETS will place the EU in a good 
position to sustain its international leadership role by exploiting first-mover advantages 
and potential linkages to other emerging emissions trading schemes (for example, in 
Australia). According to the Commission, ‘The ETS is open to linking with compatible 
greenhouse gas emission trading schemes in other countries that have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. It is foreseen that each side would agree to recognize allowances issued by the 
other, thereby expanding the market for trading’ (European Commission 2005). The 
Union has also recently confirmed EU ETS participation by three non-EU states, 
Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. 
When the EU ETS began operating in a pilot Phase on 1 January 2005, the 
member states granted emissions permits (allowances) for three years until 2007 to large 
emitters such as factories and power stations, mainly for free. In April and May 2006, 
however, the carbon market crashed when the price of permits to emit a tonne of CO2 
plunged 72 per cent to 8.60 Euro in three weeks. This was precipitated by a series of 
data releases which showed the EU ETS had a vast surplus of allowances caused by 
member states issuing far greater numbers of permits than were required to cover actual 
emissions in order to protect their energy sectors and trade-exposed industries (Grubb 
and Neuhoff 2006). In essence, this failure revealed the ever-present tensions between 
national self-interest, national sovereignty and EU solidarity on climate change. Similar 
tensions emerged over allocations for the period 2008-12, although the Commission has 
taken a stronger stance with the member states, insisting that many governments reduce 
their national allocations, and is seeking an EU-wide emissions cap from 2013 onwards 
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(Bailey 2007). These experiences nevertheless reveal potential implementation problems 
that could undermine the EU ETS credibility and the EU’s prospects for leadership at 
the international level. 
Similarly, the strategy of linking the EU ETS to other national, regional and 
international emissions trading schemes (Oberthür 2006; Legge 2007) will have to 
overcome a number of obstacles related to the technological compatibility, 
economic/financial viability and political feasibility of linking schemes. None of these 
requirements is guaranteed given the multitude of often divergent interests among the 
UNFCCC parties and observers. 
 
Regional Obstacles to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
The EU also faces internal regional obstacles to the legalities and modalities of the EU 
ETS. In particular, avoiding another price crash will require continued and robust 
scrutiny of national allocations. The most important obstacle in this regard may be the 
way National Allocation Plans (NAPs) are formulated and approved. The NAPs remain 
a controversial issue among the Union’s environmental leaders and laggards, with many 
member states disagreeing with Commission allocation decisions. In August 2007, 
Latvia joined Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Estonia in taking the 
Commission to the European Court of Justice over specific emissions calculations and 
whether the Commission has the right to influence member states’ choice of energy 
supply by imposing national emissions caps. Such legal challenges reflect very real 
practical (the tendency for member states to seek over-allocations) and political tensions 
in the development of regional emissions trading schemes (Bailey 2007). 
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As well as these qualitative obstacles, quantitative obstacles exist in the enhanced 
goals set out in the European Council’s Summit in March 2007. Achieving these will 
require improved performance from all member states and, along with the Commission’s 
proposal to move from the predominant free issue of emissions permits towards up to 80 
per cent auctioning, will exacerbate frictions with some industry groups. The EU’s 27 
members must grapple with different starting points and different abilities to reach these 
targets (Legge 2007), while ensuring that aviation emissions are dealt with 
appropriately.  
Important EU member states have already asserted opposition to the 
Commission’s blueprint for a post-2012 climate change regime. For example, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy wrote to the President of the Commission stating that ‘some 
of the pending proposals are “neither efficient, fair nor economically sustainable” for 
France… “European constraints would push industry to shift production to these 
countries [without similar carbon reduction obligations]. Global emissions would not fall 
and jobs would disappear from Europe”… French officials have reportedly also 
consulted their German counterparts on how to react’ (Kubosova 2008a). 
The French Government is by no means the only actor to identify possible 
negative impacts on certain industrial sectors as an obstacle to more vigorous EU 
climate policies. The Commission’s initiatives are expected to affect, to varying degrees, 
different energy-intensive industries, such as aluminium, cement, chemicals, fertilizers, 
pulp and paper, and steel. As Kubosova (2008a) notes, ‘These industries are expected to 
have to raise their prices under the more stringent green rules, weakening their position 
against competitors from other economic superpowers such as the US or China’. 
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The EU’s climate policies are also likely to face lobbying pressure from labour 
and other societal groups. Trade unions have already urged the Commission to delay a 
package of new climate policies ‘rather than introduce it without measures designed to 
soften its “social impact”’ (Kubosova 2008a). This package, which includes the review 
of the EU ETS in preparation for the post-2012 regime, also focuses on other changes 
necessary to achieve the EU’s desired 20 per cent cut in emissions below 1990 levels 
and to increase renewable energy by 20 per cent articulated in the European Council’s 
decision in March 2007. European labour leaders do acknowledge consultation with EU 
officials during the review process. However, the secretary general of the European 
Trade Union Confederation has asserted that his organization would like a “‘European 
low-carbon economy adjustment fund” to help workers affected by job losses, as well as 
a carbon levy on imports to protect Europe’s heavy industry from competition from 
abroad’ (Kubosova 2008a).  
Leaders of European environmental and development non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) can be expected to sustain their claims that the Union’s initiatives 
do not go far enough or create distorted effects. For example, opposition has already 
been voiced over the EU’s goal that ten per cent of transport fuels should come from 
biofuels by 2020. A group of 17 NGOs – including Oxfam and Friends of the Earth – 
wrote to the EU’s Energy Commissioner in January 2008 asking for tougher standards. 
Among their concerns were a lack of protection for important ecosystems and water and 
soil resources as well as unintended consequences of increasing food and feed prices and 
water scarcity that would negatively impact the world’s poor (Kubosova 2008b). The 
Commission has sought to develop a relatively open decision-making structure to ensure 
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the practicality and acceptability of its climate policies. However, by definition, this 
expands the range of actors that can pressurize the policy process via lobbying. 
 
POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE EU CLIMATE POLICY 
The EU represents many different and overlapping political interests and strategies for 
climate policy. All 27 member states and the EU institutions have their own interests and 
strategies, creating an institutional complexity that often confounds efforts to identify a 
single strategic actor. This section simplifies this complexity by focusing on the political 
strategies open to the Commission as the main initiator of new EU strategies and 
overseer of their implementation. The Commission also differs in comparison with the 
national polities examined in this book in the sense that it does not face direct electoral 
pressures. The Commission is certainly not insensitive to outside opinion, as its system 
of active stakeholder engagement demonstrates. However, interactions with public 
opinion tend to be mediated through the European Council, the various Councils of 
Ministers, and the European Parliament. This presents unique opportunities and 
constraints in the political strategies available to the Commission to achieve deeper cuts 
in greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
International Strategies 
The EU remains a prominent actor in international climate negotiations and, during the 
UN Climate Change Conference in Bali in December 2007, asserted a bold new 
position. Many expected the Bali negotiations to focus on a roadmap that would deal 
with the procedural issues of launching and organizing the post-2012 regime. Upon the 
EU’s insistence, however, the resulting Convention’s objective of preventing dangerous 
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levels of climate change refers to a section of the IPCC’s recent Fourth Assessment 
Report, ‘which demonstrates that emissions reductions for developed countries in the 
range of 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 are required to limit global warming to 2 
degrees above pre-industrial levels’ (European Union 2007). This assertion generated 
significant opposition from some national parties and, at the time, might have seemed an 
unproductive strategy that could have jeopardized the launch of the negotiations. The 
insertion of this section in the Convention, however, seems to have vindicated this bold 
strategy. 
Despite this early success, the Union must develop further strategies to garner 
support among other UNFCCC parties if it hopes to shape the post-2012 system towards 
its preferences. In particular, the negotiations will have to address emissions targets for 
Annex II (developing) countries. Here the EU will have to play a prominent role through 
its input in the forthcoming review of the Kyoto Protocol, scheduled for completion in 
December 2008, and new incentives and sustained political pressure will be needed to 
ensure developed and developing countries agree to future commitments. This will also 
require careful tracking of the shifting coalitions among other parties, both developed 
and developing countries. 
As the weight of scientific evidence on climate changes increases, adjustments in 
government policies among the Annex I countries – especially the APP – may change 
the nature of international climate politics. The EU must monitor closely and respond to 
these adjustments. Such strategies include intensified public information campaigns in 
the APP countries and concerted diplomatic efforts targeted at APP members with new 
governments, in particular, Australia and, soon, the USA. The EU may also need to take 
forward a threat of additional levies on products coming from states that have not 
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ratified the Kyoto Protocol, although it will need to be careful not to contravene World 
Trade Organization (WTO) trade rules. 
To pressure developing countries, the EU may consider more positive strategies, 
such as linking aid and trade packages to specific emission reduction goals. As the 
world’s largest aid donor and trading bloc and a significant source and destination of 
foreign investment, the EU possesses considerable economic leverage to encourage 
reforms in developing countries. The EU’s rather tarnished reputation in some previous 
trade negotiations with developing countries may undermine the credibility of this tactic, 
but the EU might also encourage some countries to adopt specific agreements under the 
post-2012 regime by linking these to Union support for WTO membership. Many non-
WTO members (and WTO members) will resist such pressure, but several observers – 
for example Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ethiopia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Laos, Libya, 
Sudan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Yemen – may be susceptible if the offer is part of an 
integrated package that covers other policy areas. 
Much of the EU’s international strategy will also depend on how successfully it 
implements its internal climate change policies. Ensuring effective functioning of the 
EU ETS and increasing technological and professional coordination between financial 
industries involved in the EU ETS will increase support for linkages to other trading 
schemes. Setting a normative example at home may, therefore, be an influential strategy 
for the EU to change ideas and policies abroad. 
 
Regional Strategies 
At the regional level, the Commission’s political strategizing must first and foremost 
recognize the crucial role and reasoning of the member states in determining the 
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adoption of new climate policies. Member states often challenge EU climate directives 
not because they are anti-environment but because they are concerned about whether 
policy decisions are best made in national capitals or Brussels, the extent to which such 
decisions bind them into further integration, and the implications of ambitious EU 
policies for their economic competitiveness. The Commission has, of course, faced 
similar challenges across many policy areas and has developed well-known strategies to 
cope with them, such as a strong emphasis on scientific evidence in proposals, 
widespread stakeholder consultation, and deliberately tabling overambitious proposals 
knowing that whatever measures are put forward are likely to be negotiated down in the 
Council of Ministers (Sbragia 1998; Jordan 2005). 
Alongside these standard recipes, specific strategies to promote the EU’s internal 
climate policies must first include provisions to manage cooperation among its enlarged 
membership of 27 member states. Following the 2004 and 2007 accessions, the EU faces 
the additional challenge of ensuring robust policy implementation in a number of poorer 
new member states with strong development needs and ambitions, and a poor track 
record on monitoring and enforcement. Crucially in relation to climate policy, many of 
these states also rely a great deal on heavily polluting lignite and ageing nuclear power 
facilities for energy production. It is no coincidence that all the member states that 
challenged the Commission’s decisions on national emissions caps for Phase two of EU 
ETS were new accession countries (Massai 2007). Transitional periods will be required 
but must also be managed carefully to avoid exacerbating divisions between 
environmental leader and laggard states. Building public support in the new member 
states will also be problematic. For example, ‘more than 62 percent in the new Member 
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States fear to be without a job and only 3 per cent think that environmental protection is 
the most pressing problem’ (Böhm 2006: 241-2). 
A second strategy, already being pursued but with significant remaining potential, 
is promoting more integrated policy-making across policy areas to increase the co-
benefits arising from climate policies and, hence, their acceptability to member states 
and other stakeholders. One example is the linking of climate-related strategies to energy 
security; another is the use of revenue from EU ETS allowance auctions to support tax 
cuts or other economic stimuli. The EU’s Action Plan on Energy, adopted at the 
European Council of March 2007, calls for ‘concrete actions to achieve a competitive, 
sustainable and secure energy system’ in parallel with greenhouse gas reductions 
(European Commission 2007: 10). It also sets goals for energy policy linked to energy 
efficiency for appliances, expansions in renewable energy production, biofuels, and the 
use of carbon capture and storage. On biofuels, the EU will have to be mindful of 
objections from civil society to the potential adverse effects on agriculture producers at 
home and abroad and, thus, ensure a tight focus on sustainable biofuels production. 
Another key component of securing energy security co-benefits will be to 
formulate an effective foreign policy that addresses its dependence on non-Union (in 
particular, Russian) energy sources. Because decisions on the structure of energy supply 
require unanimous support within the Council of Ministers, the EU’s ability to intervene 
on this front is restricted and pursuit of this important (and highly popular) co-benefit 
may require proposals that link energy policy goals with changes in other single market 
policies where decisions can be taken by qualified majority. 
A third political strategy needed to meet emissions targets is further broadening of 
the scope of climate policies, in particular to encompass transport and non-carbon gases. 
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The decision to include aviation in Phase three of the EU ETS represents an important 
step in this direction; however, coverage of other transportation sectors – in particular, 
shipping and automobiles – will be a contentious but necessary political objective. The 
Commission’s proposal to extend the EU ETS to all greenhouse gases should further 
enhance the scheme’s impact but will also add complicated and contentious new 
dimensions to the monitoring and enforcement of EU climate policy. Such measures will 
certainly encounter varying levels of opposition from different member states and 
stakeholder groups. The Commission will have to build coalitions of support among 
diverse political and economic actors, taking care to identify the common public- and 
private-sector interests served by incorporating other sectors and gases into the EU ETS. 
Given this landscape, the EU must develop strategies supported by financial service 
providers and other sectors that stand to benefit from emissions trading. 
Another tactic for broadening the base of EU climate policy is further expansion of 
renewables. Ensuring the political acceptability of this to the member states will require 
gradualism in the way targets are increased and differentiation between member states 
based on their capabilities. The Commission has already taken steps in this direction, 
setting criteria for determining contributions based on member states’ geographical 
potential to produce energy from different renewable sources and economic capacity to 
support investment based on GDP per capita (Goldirova 2007). The political sensitivities 
involved with adjudicating these criteria will require the Commission to develop a 
convincing methodology for determining national capabilities that will be acceptable to 
all member states, or face further cases before the European Court of Justice. 
Fourth and finally, further reforms are required to the process used to allocate 
national emission permits among its member states. National allocations for the EU ETS 
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have become more realistic during Phase two of the scheme – aided by better data on 
monitoring activities and verified emissions during the trial period – which should 
reduce (but not necessarily eliminate) the likelihood of inflated claims of need and future 
market crashes. The political heat can theoretically be taken out of this issue further if 
the member states accept the Commission’s principle of an EU-wide emissions cap, 
though neither is guaranteed. Disputes over the issue of allocations may also be reduced 
by the Commission’s proposals to increase the auctioning of EU ETS permits to 80 per 
cent (Mandell 2005; Hepburn et al. 2006), as this would privilege market forces over 
political arguments about national need as the mechanism to allocate permits.  However, 
national allocations remain a politically sensitive issue and similarly fine judgements to 
those for renewable energy capacity will be required to ensure the new approach remains 
sensitive to the development needs, energy structure and abatement potential of different 
member states. 
 
At first glance, the EU’s uniquely complex institutional and sovereignty sharing 
arrangements might seem to militate against it being a major actor in climate politics and 
policy. However, its position as a permanent and authoritative point of national and 
international interaction also provides it with significant opportunities to influence 
climate policy at multiple levels, while the Commission’s relative distance from direct 
electoral pressures enables it to develop more ambitious proposals than some of its 
member states would otherwise contemplate. Despite this, all EU policies remain subject 
to national scrutiny via the Council of Ministers and, as such, EU climate policies both 
transcend and remained strongly tied to national political interests. 
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In the final analysis, much of the EU’s domestic and international credibility in 
climate policy may hinge on the fortunes of the EU ETS. If the scheme is successful in 
reducing emissions, it is likely to stimulate further policy and technological innovations 
as well as enhanced policy learning and diffusion in other regions. A fully functional EU 
ETS should also create a first-mover advantage in lucrative financial services and set the 
seal on the EU’s reputation as a major player in international and regional climate 
policy. Conversely, weaknesses in the scheme are likely to be seized upon by other 
member states and UNFCCC parties as a justification for the continuation of more 
conservative climate policies.
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Table 4.1: The European Climate Change Programme 
Measure 
Reduction potential 
(MtCO2e) 
EU-15, 2010 
Entry into 
Force 
Starting to 
Deliver 
EU emission trading 
scheme 
- 2003 2005 
Links to joint 
implementation and CDM 
- 2004 2005-8 
Directive on promotion of 
electricity from renewable 
energy sources 
100-125 2001 2003 
Directive on promotion of 
combined heat and power 
65 2004 2006 
Directive on energy 
performance of buildings 
35-45 2003 2006 
Directive on promotion of 
transport biofuels 
35-40 2003 2005 
Landfill directive 40 1999 2000 
Vehicle manufacturer 
voluntary commitment 
(since replaced by 
mandatory targets) 
75-80 1998 1999 
Energy labelling directives 20 1992 1993 
Biomass action plan - 2005 2006 
 
Source: Delbeke (2006: 6) 
